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Abstract
We give an informal overview of the way logic and game theory have been used
in the past and are currently used to model cognitive agents and multi-agent systems
(MAS). In the first part of the paper we consider formal models of mental attitudes and
emotions, while in the second part we move from mental attitudes to institutions via
collective attitudes.
1 Introduction
Agents in the societies can be either human agents or artificial agents. The focus of this
paper is both on: (i) the present society in which human agents interact with the support of
ICT through social networks and media, and (ii) the future society with mixed interactions
between human agents and artificial systems such as autonomous agents and robots. Indeed,
new technologies will come for future society in which such artificial systems will play a
major role, so that humans will necessarily interact with them in their daily lives. This
includes autonomous cars and other vehicles, robotic assistants for rehabilitation and for
the elderly, robotic companions for learning support.
There are two main general observations underlying the present paper. The first is that
interaction plays a fundamental role in existing information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT) and applications (e.g., Facebook, Ebay, peer-to-peer systems) and will become
even more fundamental in future ICT. The second is that the cognitive aspect is crucial for
the design of intelligent systems that are expected to interact with human agents (e.g., em-
bodied conversational agents, robotic assistants, etc.). The system must be endowed with a
psychologically plausible model of reasoning and cognition in order to be able (i) to under-
stand the human agent’s needs and to predict her behaviour, and (ii) to behave in a believable
way thereby meeting the human agent’s expectations.
Formal methods have been widely used in artificial intelligence (AI) and in the area of
multi-agent systems (MAS) for modelling intelligent systems as well as different aspects of
social interaction between artificial and/or human agents. The aim of the present paper is to
offer a general overview of the way logic and game theory have been and can be used in AI
in order to build formal models of socio-cognitive, normative and institutional phenomena.
We take a bottom-up perspective to the analysis of normative and institutional facts that
is in line with some classical analysis in organization theory such as the one presented in
March & Simon’s famous book “Organizations" [102], described as a book in which they:
“...surveyed the literature on organization theory, starting with those theories
that viewed the employee as an instrument and physiological automaton, pro-
ceeding through theories that were centrally concerned with the motivational
and affective aspects of human behavior, and concluding with theories that
placed particular emphasis on cognitive processes” [102, p. 5].
The present paper is organized in two main sections. Section 2 is devoted to cognitive
aspects, while Section 3 is devoted to institutional ones. Section 2 starts from the assump-
tion that cognitive agents are, by definition, endowed with a variety of mental attitudes
such as beliefs, desires, preferences and intentions that provide input for practical reasoning
and decision-making, trigger action execution, and generate emotional responses. We first
present a conceptual framework that:
• clarifies the relationship between intention and action and the role of intention in
practical reasoning;
• explains how moral attitudes such as standards, ideals and moral values influence
decision-making;
• explains how preferences are formed on the basis of desires and moral values;
• clarifies the distinction between the concept of goal and the concept of preference;
• elucidates how mental attitudes including beliefs, desires and intentions trigger emo-
tional responses, and how emotions retroactively influence decision-making and men-
tal attitudes by triggering belief revision, desire change and intention reconsideration.
Then, we explain how game theory and logic have been used in order to develop formal 
models of such cognitive phenomena. We put special emphasis on a specific b ranch of 
game theory, called epistemic game theory, and on a specific f amily o f l ogics, so-called 
agent logics. The aim of epistemic game theory is to extend the classical game-theoretic 
framework with mental notions such as the concepts of belief and knowledge, while agent 
logics are devoted to explain how different types of mental attitudes (e.g., belief, desires, in-
tentions) are related, how they influence decision and action, and how they trigger emotional 
responses.
Section 3 builds the connection between mental attitudes and institutions passing by 
the concept of collective attitude. Collectives attitudes such as joint intention, group belief, 
group goal, collective acceptance and joint commitment have been widely explored in the 
area of collective intentionality, the domain of social philosophy that studies how agents 
function and act at the group level and how institutional facts relate with physical (brute) 
facts (cf. [100; 140] for a general introduction of the research in this area). Section 3 is 
devoted to explain (i) how collective attitudes such as collective acceptance or common 
belief are formed either through aggregation of individual attitudes or through a process 
of joint perception, (ii) how institutional facts are grounded on collective attitudes and, in 
particular, how the existence and modification of institutional facts depend on the collective 
acceptance of these facts by the agent in the society and on the evolution of this collective 
acceptance. We also discuss existing logics for institutions that formalize the connection 
between collective attitudes and institutional facts.
In Section 4 we conclude by briefly considering the opposite path leading from norms 
and institutions to minds. In particular, we explain how institutions and norms, whose 
existence depends on their acceptance by the agents in the society, retroactively influence 
the agents’ mental attitudes, decisions and actions.
2 Mental attitudes and emotions
In this section, we start with a discussion of two issues related with the representation of 
mental attitudes and emotions: (i) the cognitive processing leading from goal generation to 
action (Section 2.1), and (ii) the representation of the cognitive structure of emotions and 
of their influence on behaviour (Section 2.2). Then, we briefly explain how these cognitive 
aspects have been incorporated into game theory (Section 2.3). Finally, we consider how 
mental attitudes and emotion are formalized in logic and the connection between the rep-
resentation of mental attitudes in logic and the representation of mental attitudes in game 
theory (Section 2.4).
2.1 A cognitive architecture
The conceptual background underlying our view of mental attitudes is summarized in Fig-
ure 1. (Cf. [90] for a logical formalization of some aspects of this view.) The cognitive 
architecture represents the process leading from generation of desires and moral values and 
formation of beliefs via sensing to action performance.
The origin of beliefs, desires and moral values An important and general distinction 
in philosophy of mind is between epistemic attitudes and motivational attitudes. This dis-
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Figure 1: Cognitive architecture
tinction is in terms of the direction of fit o f m ental a ttitudes t o t he w orld. W hile epis-
temic attitudes aim at being true and their being true is their fitting t he w orld, motiva-
tional attitudes aim at realization and their realization is the world fitting t hem [ 114; 7; 
67]. Searle [125] calls “mind-to-world” the first kind of direction of fit and “world-to-mind” 
the second one.
There are different kinds of epistemic and motivational attitudes with different functions 
and properties. Examples of epistemic attitudes are beliefs, knowledge and opinions, while 
examples of motivational attitudes are desires, preferences, moral values and intentions. 
However, the most primitive and basic forms of epistemic and motivational attitudes are 
beliefs, desires and moral values.
Beliefs are mental representations aimed at representing how the physical, mental and 
social worlds are. Indeed, there are beliefs about natural facts and physical events (e.g., 
I believe that tomorrow will be a sunny day), introspective beliefs (e.g., I believe that I 
strongly wish that tomorrow will be a sunny day), and beliefs about mental attitudes of 
other agents (e.g., I believe that you believe that tomorrow will be a sunny day).
Following the Humean conception, a desire can be viewed as an agent’s attitude con-
sisting in an anticipatory mental representation of a pleasant state of affairs (representa-
tional dimension of desires) that motivates the agent to achieve it (motivational dimension 
of desires). The motivational dimension of an agent’s desire is realized through its repre-
sentational dimension, in the sense that, a desire motivates an agent to achieve it because 
the agent’s anticipatory representation of the desire’s content gives her pleasure so that the 
agent is “attracted” by it. For example when an agent desires to eat sushi, she is pleased to
imagine herself eating sushi. This pleasant representation motivates her to go to the “The
Japoyaki” restaurant in order to eat sushi. This view of desires unifies the standard theory
of desire (STD) — focused on the motivational dimension — and the hedonic theory of
desire (HTD) — focused on the hedonic dimension —. A third theory of desire has been
advanced in the philosophical literature (see [124]), the so-called reward theory of desire
(RTD). According to RTD what qualifies a mental attitude as a desire is the exercise of a
capacity to represent a certain fact as a reward.1
Another fundamental aspect of desire is the longing aspect. The idea is that for an agent
to desire something, the agent should be in a situation in which she does not have what she
desires and she yearns for it. In other words, a state of affairs is desired by an agent only if
the agent conceives it as absent. The following quotation from Locke [86, Book II, Chap.
XXI] makes this point clear:
To return then to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard
to our actions? And that...is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in
view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is
at present under. This that which successively determines the will, and sets us
upon those actions, we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire;
which is uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good...
This quotation seems in contradiction with what we claimed above, namely, that desire is
based on the anticipatory representation of a pleasant state of affairs. However, the stronger
the anticipated pleasure associated with a desire, the more painful is its current lack of
fulfillment — the term “uneasiness” in the previous quotation —, as in the case of longing
for a drink when thirsty, for instance. So the contradiction is only apparent. This aspect of
uneasiness described by Locke should not be confused with the concept of aversion which
is traditionally opposed to the concept of desire (see [124, Chap. 5]). As emphasized
above, if an agent desires a certain fact to be true, then she possesses an anticipatory mental
representation of a pleasant fact motivating her to make the fact true. On the contrary, if an
agent is averse to something, then she possesses an anticipatory mental representation of an
unpleasant fact motivating her to prevent the fact from being true.
Moral values, and more generally moral attitudes (ideals, standards, etc.), originate from
an agent’s capability of discerning what from her point of view is (morally) good from what
is (morally) bad. If an agent has a certain ideal ϕ, then she thinks that the realization
of the state of affairs ϕ ought to be promoted because ϕ is good in itself. Differently
from desires, moral values do not necessarily have a hedonic and somatic component: their
1According to [39], desire is also a necessary condition for reward. In particular, desire determines what 
counts as a reward for an agent. For example, a person can be rewarded with with water only if she is thirsty 
and she desires to drink.
fulfillment does not necessarily give pleasure and their transgression does not necessarily
give displeasure ‘felt’ from the body.
There are different ways to explain the origin of beliefs, desires, moral values. Beliefs
are formed either via direct sensing from the external environment (e.g., I believe that there
is a fire in the house since I can see it), communication (e.g., I believe that there is a fire in
the house since you told me this and I trust what you say) and inference (e.g., I believe that
there is a fire in the house since I already believe that smoke comes out from the house and
if there is smoke coming out from the house then there is fire). One might argue that be-
lief formation via direct sensing is more primitive than belief formation via communication
and that the latter can be reduced to the former. Indeed, in the context of communication,
the hearer first perceives the speaker’s utterance, which is nothing but the performance of
a physical action (e.g., uttering a certain sound, performing a certain gesture, emitting a
certain light signal, etc.) and forms a belief about what the speaker has uttered. Then, she
infers the meaning of the speaker’s utterance (i.e., what the speaker wants to express by
uttering a certain sound, by performing a certain gesture, by emitting a certain light sig-
nal, etc.). Although this is true for communication between humans and between artificial
systems situated in the physical environment such as robots, it is not necessarily true for
communication in an artificial domain in which there is no precise distinction between an
utterance and its meaning. In the latter situation, the speaker may transmit to the hearer a
message (e.g., a propositional formula) with a precise and non-ambiguous meaning.
The concept of trust plays a fundamental role in belief formation via direct sensing and
via communication. Indeed, the hearer will not believe what the speaker says unless she
believes that the speaker is a reliable source of information, thereby trusting the speaker’s
judgment. Similarly, for belief formation via direct sensing, an agent will not believe what
she sees unless she believes that her perceptual apparatus works properly, thereby trusting it.
The issue whether trust is reducible to other mental attitudes is relevant here. A justifiable
approach consists in conceiving communication-based trust as a belief about the reliability
of a source of information, where “reliable” means that, in the normal conditions, what the
source says about a given issue is true.
The explanation about the origin of desires adopted in Figure 1 is that they are activated
under certain conditions. For instance, according to Maslow’s seminal theory of human
motivation, “...everyday conscious desires are to be regarded as symptoms, as surface in-
dicators of more basic needs” [103, p. 392]. Maslow identified a set of basic (most of the
time unconscious) needs of human agents including physiological needs,2 need for safety,
need for love and belonging, need for self-esteem and need for self-actualization. For ex-
ample, a human agent’s desire of drinking a glass of water could be activated by her basic
2Maslow referred to the concept of homeostasis, as the living system’s automatic efforts to maintain a 
constant, normal state of the blood stream, body temperature, and so on.
physiological need for bodily balance including a constant body temperature, constant salt
levels in the body, and so on. If certain variables of the agent’s body are unbalanced and
this unbalance is detected,3 the agent receives a negative unpleasant signal from her body
thereby entering in a state of felt displeasure and uneasiness — in the Lockean sense —.
Consequently, she becomes intrinsically motivated to restore bodily balance. The connec-
tion between the agent’s basic need for bodily balance and the agent’s desire of drinking
a glass of water may rely on the agent’s previous experiences and be the product of oper-
ant conditioning (also called instrumental learning). Specifically, the agent may have learnt
that, under certain conditions, drinking a glass a water is “a suitable means for” restoring
balance of certain variables of the body. Indeed, every time the agent drunk water when she
was feeling thirsty, she got a reward by making her basic need for bodily balance satisfied.4
In the case of artificial agents, conditions of desire activation should be specified by the
system’s designer. For example, a robotic assistant who has to take care of an old person
could be designed in such a way that, every day at 4 pm, the desire of giving a medicine to
the old person is activated in its mind.
As for the origin of moral values, social scientists (e.g., [6]) have defended the idea
that there exist innate moral principles in humans such as fairness which are the product
of biological evolution. Other moral values, as highlighted in Figure 1, have a cultural
and social origin, as they are the product of the internalization of some external norm. A
possible explanation is based on the hypothesis that moral judgments are true or false only
in relation to and with reference to one or another agreement between people forming a
group or a community. More precisely, an agent’s moral values are simply norms of the
group or community to which the agent belongs that have been internalized by the agent.
This is the essence of the philosophical doctrine of moral relativism (see, e.g., [20]). For
example, suppose that an agent believes that in a certain group or community there exists a
norm (e.g., an obligation) prescribing that a given state of affairs should be true. Moreover,
assume that the agent identifies herself as a member of this group or community. In this
case, the agent will internalize the norm, that is, the external norm will become a moral
value of the agent and will affect the agent’s decisions. For example, suppose that a certain
person is (and identifies herself as) citizen of a given country. As in every civil country, it is
prescribed that citizens should pay taxes. Her sense of national identity will lead the person
to adopt the obligation by imposing the imperative to pay taxes to herself. When deciding
to pay taxes or not, she will decide to do it, not simply in order to avoid being sanctioned
and being exposed to punishment, but also because she is motivated by the moral obligation
3Converging empirical evidences from neuroscience show that the hypothalamus is responsible for moni-
toring these bodily conditions.
4Following [124], one might argue that most conscious desires (including the desire to eat at a particular 
time and the desire to drink water) are instrumental, as they are activated in order to satisfy more basic needs 
of the individual.
to paying taxes.
From desires and moral values to preferences According to contemporary theories of
human motivation both in philosophy and in economics (e.g., [127; 60]), preferences of a
rational agent may originate either (i) from somatically-marked motivations such as desires
or physiological needs and drives (e.g., the goal of drinking a glass of water originated
from the phisiological drive of thirst), or (ii) from moral considerations and values (e.g.,
the goal of helping a poor person originated from the moral value of taking care of needy
people). More generally, there exists desire-dependent preferences and desire-independent
ones originated from moral values. This distinction allows us to identify two different kinds
of moral dilemmas. The first kind of moral dilemma is the one which is determined by
the logical conflict between two moral values. The paradigmatic example is the situation
of a soldier during a war. As a member of the army, the soldier feels obliged to kills his
enemies, if this is the only way to defend his country. But, as a catholic, he thinks that
human life should be respected. Therefore, he feels morally obliged not to kill other people.
The other kind of moral dilemma is the one which is determined by the logical conflict
between desires and moral values. The paradigmatic example is that of Adam and Eve in
the garden of Eden. They are tempted by the desire to eat the forbidden fruit and, at the
same time, they have a moral obligation not to do it.
According to the cognitive architecture represented in Figure 1, desires and moral atti-
tudes of an agent are two different parameters affecting the agent’s preferences. This allows
us to draw the distinction between hedonistic agents and moral agents. A purely hedonistic
agent is an agent who acts in order to maximize the satisfaction of her own desires, while
a purely moral agent is an agent who acts in order to maximize the fulfillment of her own
moral values. In other words, if an agent is purely hedonistic, the utility of an action for
her coincides with the personal good the agent will obtain by performing this action, where
the agent’s personal good coincides with the satisfaction of the agent’s own desires. If an
agent is purely moral, the utility of an action for her coincides with the moral good the agent
will promote by performing this action, where the agent’s promotion of the moral good co-
incides with the accomplishment of her own moral values. Utility is just the quantitative
counterpart of the concept of preference, that is, the more an agent prefers something, the
higher its utility. Of course, purely hedonistic agents and purely moral agents are just ex-
tremes cases. An agent is more or less moral depending on whether the utility of a given
option for her is more or less affected by her moral values. More precisely, the higher is
the influence of the agent’s moral values on evaluating the utility of a given decision option,
the more moral the agent is. The extent to which an agent’s utility is affected by her moral
values can be called degree of moral sensitivity.5
5This degree can be conceived as a personality trait. In the case of human agents, it is either culturally
Goals The reason why, in Figure 1, preferences and goals are included in the same box
is that we conceive goals as intimately related with preferences. In particular, we assume
that an agent has ϕ as a goal (or wants to achieve ϕ) if and only if: (i) the agent prefers
ϕ to be true to ϕ to be false, and (ii) the agent considers ϕ a possible state of affairs (ϕ is
compatible with what the agent believes). The second property is called realism of goals
by philosophers (cf. [22; 37; 104]). It is based on the idea that an agent cannot reasonably
pursue a goal unless she thinks that she can possibly achieve it, i.e., there exists at least one
possible evolution of the world (a history) that the agent considers possible along which ϕ
is true. Indeed, an agent’s goal should not be incompatible with the agent’s beliefs. This
explains the influence of beliefs on the goal generation process, as depicted in Figure 1.6
The first property is about the motivational aspect of goals. For ϕ to be a goal, the agent
should not be indifferent between ϕ and ¬ϕ, in the sense that, the agent prefers a situation in
which ϕ is true to a situation in whichϕ is false, all other things being equal. In other words,
the utility of a situation increases in the direction by the formula ϕ ceteris paribus (“all else
being equal”) [154]. This property also defines Von Wright’s concept of “preference of ϕ
over ¬ϕ” [152].7 According to this interpretation, a goal is conceived as a realistic ceteris
paribus preference for ϕ.
However not all goals have the same status. Certain goals have a motivating force while
others do not have it. Indeed, the fact that the agent prefers ϕ being true to ϕ being false does
not necessarily imply that the agent is motivated to achieve a state in which ϕ is true and
that she decides to perform a certain action in order to achieve it. For ϕ to be a motivating
goal, for every possible situation that the agent envisages in which ϕ is true and for every
possible situation that the agent envisages in which ϕ is false, the agent has to prefer the
former to the latter. In other words, there is no way for the agent to be satisfied without
achieving ϕ.8
An example better clarifies this point. Suppose Mary wants to buy a reflex camera
Nikon and, at the same time, she would like to spend no more than 300 euros. In other
words, Mary has two goals in her mind:
• G1: the goal of buying a reflex camera Nikon, and
• G2: the goal of spending no more than 300 euros.
She goes to the shop and it turns out that all reflex cameras Nikon cost more than 300
euros. This implies that Mary believes that she cannot achieve the two goals at the same
acquired or genetically determined. In the case of artificial agents, it is configured by the system designer.
6The idea that beliefs form an essential ingredient of the goal generation process is also suggested by [26].
7Von Wright presents a more general concept of “preference of ϕ over ψ” which has been recently for-
malized in a modal logic setting by [146]. See also [119] for an interpretation of this ceteris paribus condition
based on the concept of logical independence between formulas.
8The term ‘satisfied’ just means that the agent achieves what she prefers.
time, as she envisages four situations in her mind but only three are considered possible by
her: the situation in which only the goal G1 is achieved, the situation in which only the
goal G2 is achieved and the situation in which no goal is achieved. The situation in which
both goals are achieved is considered impossible by Mary. This is not inconsistent with the
previous definition of goal since Mary still believes that it is possible to achieve each goal
separately from the other. Figure 2 clearly illustrates this: the full rectangle includes all
worlds that Mary envisages, so-called information set, while the dotted rectangle includes
all worlds that Mary considers actually possible, so-called belief set.9 (Cf. [76; 91] for a
logical account of the distinction between information set and belief set.)
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Figure 2: Example for goals
Mary decides to save her money since the goal G2 is a motivating one, while the goal
G1 is not. To see that G1 is a goal, it is sufficient to observe that, all other things being
equal, Mary prefers a situation in which she buys a Nikon to the situation in which she
does not buy it. In fact, w4 is preferred to w3 and w1 is preferred to w2. Moreover, w4
and w3 are equal in everything except at w4 Mary buys a Nikon while at w3 she does not.
Similarly, w1 and w2 are equal in everything except at w1 Mary buys a Nikon while at w2
she does not. To see that G1 is not motivating, it is sufficient to observe that there exists a
situation in which Mary does not buy a Nikon (w3) that is preferred to a situation in which
she does it (w1). Finally, to see that G2 is a motivating goal, we just need to observe that
9Mary’s information set includes all worlds that, according to Mary, are compatible with the laws of nature. 
For instance, Mary can perfectly envisage a world in which she is the president of French republic even though 
she considers this actually impossible.
every situation in which she spends no more than 300 euros (w3 and w4) is preferred to 
every situation in which this is not the case (w1 and w2). Thus, on the basis of what she 
believes, Mary concludes that she can only achieve her goal G2 by saving her money and 
by buying nothing in the shop.
From preferences and beliefs to actions As the cognitive architecture in Figure 1 high-
lights, beliefs and preferences are those mental attitudes which determine the agent’s 
choices and are responsible for the formation of new intentions about present actions 
(present-directed intentions) and future actions (future-directed intentions). As emphasized 
in the literature in philosophy [22; 105] and AI [23], a future-directed intention is the ele-
ment of a partial or a complete plan of the agent: an agent may have the intention to perform 
a sequence of actions later (e.g., the action of going to the train station in two hours followed 
by the action of taking the train from Paris to Bruxelles at 10 am) in order to achieve a cer-
tain goal (e.g., the goal of being in Bruxelles at the European Commission at 2 pm). A 
present-directed intention is a direct motivation to perform an action now.
In particular, decision is determined by beliefs, preferences and a general rationality 
criterion stating what an agent should do on the basis of what she believes and what she 
prefers. Different kinds of rationality criteria have been studied in the areas of decision 
theory and game theory ranging from expected utility maximization, maxmin and maxmax 
to satisficing [ 133]. Once the choice has been made by the agent and the corresponding 
intention has been formed, the action is performed right afterwards or later. Specifically, an 
agent forms the intention to perform a certain action at a given point in time and, once the 
time of the planned action execution is attained, the agent performs the action unless before 
attaining it, she has reconsidered her prior intention.
2.2 A cognitive view of emotion
In the recent years, emotion has become a central topic in AI. The main motivation of 
this line of research lies in the possibility of developing computational and formal models 
of artificial agents who are expected to interact with h umans. To ensure the accuracy of 
a such formal models, it is important to consider how emotions have been defined in the 
psychological literature. Indeed, in order to build artificial a gents w ith t he c apability of 
recognizing the emotions of a human user, of behaving in a believable way, of affecting the 
user’s emotions by the performance of actions directed to her emotions (e.g. actions aimed 
at reducing the human’s stress due to his negative emotions, actions aimed at inducing 
positive emotions in the human), such agents must be endowed with an adequate model of 
human emotions.
Appraisal theory The most popular psychological theory of emotion in AI is the so-called 
appraisal theory (cf. [123] for a broad introduction to the developments in appraisal theory). 
This theory has emphasized the strong relationship between emotion and cognition, by stat-
ing that each emotion can be related to specific patterns of evaluations and interpretations of 
events, situations or objects (appraisal patterns) based on a number of dimensions or criteria 
called appraisal variables (e.g. goal relevance, desirability, likelihood, causal attribution). 
Appraisal variables are directly related to the mental attitudes of the individual (e.g. beliefs, 
predictions, desires, goals, intentions). For instance, when prospecting the possibility of 
winning a lottery and considering ‘I win the lottery’ as a desirable event, an agent might 
feel an intense hope. When prospecting the possibility of catching a disease and considering 
‘I catch a disease’ as an undesirable event, an agent might feel an intense fear.
Most appraisal models of emotions assume that explicit evaluations based on eval-
uative beliefs (i.e. the belief that a certain event is good or bad, pleasant or unpleas-
ant, dangerous or frustrating) are a necessary constituent of emotional experience. On 
the other hand, there are some appraisal models mostly promoted by philosophers [126; 
50] in which emotions are reduced to specific combinations of beliefs and desires, and in 
which the link between cognition and emotion is not necessarily mediated by evaluative 
beliefs. Reisenzein [118] calls cognitive-evaluative the former and cognitive-motivational 
the latter kind of models. For example, according to cognitive-motivational models of 
emotions, a person’s happiness about a certain fact ϕ can be reduced to the person’s be-
lief that ϕ obtains and the person’s desire that ϕ obtains. On the contrary, according to 
cognitive-evaluative models, a person feels happy about a certain fact ϕ if she believes 
that ϕ obtains and she evaluates ϕ to be good (desirable) for her. The distinction be-
tween cognitive-evaluative models and cognitive-motivational models is reminiscent of the 
opposition between the Humean view and the anti-Humean view of desire in philoso-
phy of mind. According to the Humean view, belief and desires are distinct mental at-
titudes that are not reducible one to the other. Moreover, according to this view, there 
are no necessary connections between beliefs and desires, i.e., beliefs do not necessar-
ily require corresponding desires and, viceversa, desires do not necessarily require cor-
responding beliefs. On the contrary, the anti-Humean view defends the idea that beliefs and 
desires are necessarily connected. A specific version of anti-Humeanism i s the so-called 
“Desire-as-Belief Thesis” criticized by the philosopher David Lewis in [80] (see also [81; 
57]). In line with cognitive-evaluative models, this thesis states that an agent desires some-
thing to the extent that she believes it to be good.
The popularity of appraisal theory in logic and AI is easily explained by the fact that it 
perfectly fits with the concepts and level of abstraction of existing logical and computational 
models of cognitive agents developed in these areas. Especially cognitive-motivational 
models use folk-psychology concepts such as belief, knowledge, desire and intention that 
are traditionally used in logic and AI for modelling cognitive agents.
The conceptual background underlying our view of appraisal theory is depicted in Fig­
ure 3 which is nothing but the cognitive architecture of Figure 1 extended with an emotion 
component. 
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Figure 3: Cognitive architecture extended with emotions 
Environment 
Figure 3 highlights the role of mentaJ attitudes in emotion. In particular, it highlights the 
fact that mentaJ attitudes of different kinds such as belief, desires, preferences, goals, moral 
values and (present-directed or future-directed) intentions deterrnine emotional responses. 
For example, as emphasized above, the emotional response of happiness is triggered by 
a goal and the certain belief that the content of one's goaJ is true. On the contrary, the 
emotional response of sadness is triggered by a goal and the certain belief that the content of 
one's goaJ is faJse. The emotional response of hope is triggered by a goal and the uncertain 
belief that the content of one's goal is true. On the contrary, the emotional response of 
fear is triggered by a goal and the uncertain belief that the content of one's goal is false. 
This view is consistent with a famous appraisal mode!, the so-caJJed OCC psychological 
mode[ of emotions [111), according to which, while joy and distress are triggered by actual 
consequences, hope and fear are triggered by prospective consequences (or prospects). [52) 
interpret the term 'prospect' as synonymous of 'uncertain consequence' (in contrast with 
'actual consequence' as synonymous of 'certain consequence'). 
Moral guilt and reproach are examples of emotions that are triggered by moral values 
[56). While moral guilt is triggered by the belief of being responsible for the violation of 
a moral value or the belief that one is responsible for having behaved in a morally repre­
hensible way, reproach is triggered by the belief that someone else is responsible for the 
violation of a moral value or belief that someone else is responsible for having behaved in a 
morally reprehensible way. In other words, guilt is triggered by self-attribution of responsi-
bility for the violation of a moral value, while reproach is triggered by attribution to others
of responsibility for the violation of a moral value.
Intentions as well might be responsible for triggering certain kinds of emotional re-
sponse. For instance, as emphasized by psychological theories of anger (e.g., [77; 111;
121]), a necessary condition for an agent 1 to be angry towards another agent 2 is the agent
1’s belief that agent 2 has performed an action that has damaged her, that is, 1 believes
that she has been kept from attaining an important goal by an improper action of agent 2.
Anger becomes more intense when agent 1 believes that agent 2 has intentionally caused
the damage. In this sense, an agent 1’s belief about another agent 2’s intention may have
implications on the intensity of agent 1’s emotions.
Figure 3 also represents how emotions retroactively influence mental states and decision
either (i) through coping or (ii) through anticipation and prospective thinking (i.e., the act
of mentally simulating the future) in the decision-making phase.
Coping is the process of dealing with emotion, either externally by forming an intention
to act in the world (problem-focused coping) or internally by changing the agent’s interpre-
tation of the situation and the mental attitudes that triggered and sustained the emotional
response (emotion-focused coping) [77]. For example, when feeling an intense fear due to
an unexpected and scaring stimulus, an agent starts to reconsider her beliefs and intentions
in order to update her knowledge in the light of the new scaring information and to avoid
running into danger (emotion-focused coping). Then, the agent forms an intention to go
out of danger (problem-focused coping). Another agent can try to discharge her feeling
of guilt for having damaged someone either by forming the intention to repair the damage
(problem-focused coping) or by reconsidering the belief about her responsibility for the
damage (emotion-focused coping). The coping process as well as its relation with appraisal
is illustrated in Figure 4.
Influence of emotion on decision The influence of emotion on decision-making has been
widely studied both in psychology and in economics. Rick & Loewenstein [120] distinguish
the following three forms of influence:
• Immediate emotions: real emotions experienced at the time of decision-making:
– Integral influences: influences from immediate emotions that arise from con-
templating the consequences of the decision itself,
– Incidental influences: influences from immediate emotions that arise from fac-
tors unrelated to the decision at hand (e.g., the agent’s current mood or chronic
dispositional affect);
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• Anticipated emotions: predictions about the emotional consequences of decision
outcomes (they are not experienced as emotions per se at the time of decision­
making).
An example of integral influence of an imrnediate emotion is given by the following 
example. 
Example 1. Paul would like to eat some candies but her mother Mary has forbidden him to 
eat candies without her permission. Paul's fear of the sanction influences Paul's decision 
not to eat candies without asking permission. 
The following example illustrates incidental influence of an imrnediate emotion. 
Example 2. Mary has quarreled with her colleague Paul. At the end of the day she goes 
back home after work and on the metro a beggar asks her for money. Few hours after the 
quarre/ with Paul, Mary is still in a bad mood and because of her current disposition she 
refuses the beggar's request. 
The following example illustrates the influence of anticipated emotions on decision. 
Example 3. Peter has to decide whether to leave her job as a researcher at the university of 
Paris and to accept a job offer as a professor at a university in the US. She decides to accept 
the job offer because she thinks that, if she refuses it, she will likely regret her decision. 
One of the most prominent theory of the integral influence of emotion on decision is 
Damasio’s theory of the somatic marker [35]. According to this theory, decision between 
different courses of actions leads to potentially advantageous (positive) or harmful (nega-
tive) outcomes. These outcomes induce a somatic response used to mark them and to signal 
their danger or advantage. In particular, a negative somatic marker ‘signals’ to the agent 
the fact that a certain course of action should be avoided, while a positive somatic marker 
provides an incentive to choose a specific course of action. According to Damasio’s theory, 
somatic markers depend on past experiences. Specifically, pain or pleasure experienced as 
a consequence of an outcome are stored in memory and are felt again when the outcome is 
envisaged in the decision-making process. The following example clearly illustrates this.10
Example 4. Mary lives in Toulouse and has to decide whether to go to Paris by plane 
or by train. Last time she traveled by plane she had a painful experience because of turbu-
lence. Mary envisages the possibility of incurring again in a turbulence and gets frightened, 
thereby deciding to travel by train.
Several works aimed at extending the classical expected utility model to incorporate 
anticipated emotions that are related to our uncertainty about the future, such as hopeful-
ness, anxiety, and suspense [27]. Some economic models of decision-making consider how 
the anticipation of a future regret might affect a person’s current decision [87]. In partic-
ular, according to these models, if a person believes that after choosing a certain action 
she will likely regret for having made this choice, she will be less willing to choose the 
action (than in the case in which she does not believe this). These models agree in defining 
regret as the emotion that stems from the comparison between the actual outcome deriv-
ing from a given choice and a counterfactual better outcome that might have been had one 
chosen a different action [45; 70; 157]. More recently, some economists have studied the 
influence of strategic emotions such as interpersonal guilt and anger on decision [10; 29; 
65]. Following psychological theories of interpersonal guilt [12; 139], models developed in 
this area assume that the prototypical cause of guilt is the infliction of harm, loss, or dis-
tress on a relationship partner. Moreover, they assume that if people feel guilty for hurting 
their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations, they will alter their behavior 
(to avoid guilt) in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship. This 
is different from the concept of moral guilt formalized by [97] according to which a person 
feels (morally) guilty if she believes that she is responsible for having behaved in a morally 
reprehensible way (see Section 2.4 for more details).
10Positive and negative somatic markers can operate either at a conscious level or at a unconscious/automatic 
level. This corresponds to Ledoux’s distinction between explicit memory and implicit memory and between two 
possible elaborations of a stimulus inducing an emotional response [78]: conscious elaboration vs. automatic 
elaboration.
2.3 Interacting minds: from game theory to epistemic game theory
The idea highlighted in Section 2.1 of describing rational agents in terms of their epistemic
and motivational attitudes, is also adopted by classical decision theory and game theory. In
particular, classical decision theory accounts for the criteria and principles (e.g., expected
utility maximization) that a rational agent should apply in order to decide what to do on the
basis of her beliefs and preferences. Game theory generalizes decision theory to the multi-
agent case in which agents’ decisions are interdependent and agents’ actions might interfere
between them so that: (i) the possibility for an agent to achieve her goals may depend on
what the other agents decide to do, and (ii) agents form beliefs about the future choices
of the other players and, consequently, their current decisions are influenced by what they
believe the others will do. More generally, game theory involves a strategic component that
is not considered by classical decision theory whose object of analysis is a single agent who
makes decisions and acts in an environment she does not share with other agents.
Classical decision theory and game theory provide a quantitative account of individual
and strategic decision-making by assuming that agents’ beliefs and preferences can be re-
spectively modeled by subjective probabilities and utilities. In particular, while subjective
probability captures the extent to which a fact is believed by a certain agent, utility captures
how much a certain state of affairs is preferred by the agent. In other words, subjective prob-
ability is the quantitative counterpart of the concept of belief, while utility is the quantitative
counterpart of the concept of preference.11
One of the fundamental concepts of game theory is the concept of solution which is,
at the same time, a prescriptive notion, in the sense that it prescribes how rational agents
in a given interaction should play, and a predictive one, in the sense that it allows us to
predict how the agents will play. There exist many different solution concepts both for
games in normal form and for games in extensive form (e.g., Nash Equilibrium, iterated
deletion of strongly dominated strategies, iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies,
correlated equilibrium, backward induction, forward induction, etc.) and new ones have
been proposed in the recent years (see, e.g., [58]). A major issue we face when we want
to use a solution concept in order either to predict human behavior or to build some prac-
tical applications (e.g., for computer security or for multi-agent systems) is to evaluate its
significance. Some of the questions that arise in these situations are, for instance: given cer-
tain assumptions about the agents such as the assumption that they are rational (e.g., utility
11Qualitative approaches to individual and strategic decision-making have been proposed in AI [18; 68] to 
characterize criteria that a rational agent should adopt for making decisions when she cannot build a probability 
distribution over the set of possible events and her preference over the set of possible outcomes cannot be 
expressed by a utility function but only by a qualitative ordering over the outcomes. For example, going beyond 
expected utility maximization, qualitative criteria such as the maxmin principle (choose the action that will 
minimize potential loss) and the maxmax principle (choose the action that will maximize potential gain) have 
been studied and axiomatically characterized [19; 20].
maximizers), under which conditions will the agents converge to equilibrium? Are these 
conditions realistic? Are they too strong for the domain of application under consideration?
There is a branch of game theory, called epistemic game theory, which can help to answer 
these questions (cf. [113] for a general introduction to the research in this area). Indeed, 
the aim of epistemic game theory is to provide an analysis of the necessary and/or sufficient 
epistemic conditions of the different solution concepts, that is, the assumptions about the 
epistemic states of the players that are necessary and/or sufficient to ensure that they will 
play according to the prescription of the solution concept. Typical epistemic conditions 
which have been considered are, for example, the assumption that players have common 
belief (or common knowledge) about the rationality of every player,12 the assumption that 
every player knows the choices of the others,13 or the assumption that players are logically 
omniscient.14
Epistemic game theory shares concepts and methods with what Aumann calls inter-
active epistemology [8]. The latter is the research area in logic and philosophy which 
deals with formal models of knowledge and belief when there is more than one rational 
agent or “player” in the context of interaction having not only knowledge and beliefs about 
substantive matters, but also knowledge and beliefs about the others’ knowledge and be-
liefs. The concept of rationality corresponds either to the optimality criterion according to 
which an agent should choose an action which guarantees the highest utility, given what 
she believes the other agents will do, or the prudential criterion according to which an 
agent should not choose an action which ensures the lowest utility, given what she be-
lieves the other agents will do. An example of the former is expected utility maximization, 
while an example of the latter is weak rationality in the sense of [145] (cf. also [109; 
15]), according to which an agent should not choose an action which is strongly dominated 
by another action, given what the agent believes the other agents will do.
Epistemic game theory provides a useful framework for clarifying how agents’ mental 
attitudes influence b ehaviours o f a gents i n a  s ocial s etting. I n p articular, i t a llows u s to 
understand the subtle connection between beliefs, preferences and decision, as represented 
in Figure 1 given in Section 2.1, under the assumption that the agents’ decisions are in-
terdependent, in the sense that they are affected by what the agents believe the others will 
choose.15
12This is the typical condition of iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (also called iterated strong 
dominance).
13This condition is required in order to ensure that the agents will converge to a Nash equilibrium.
14See [158] for an analysis of iterated strong dominance after relaxing the assumption of logical omni-
science.
15Although epistemic game theory and, more generally, game theory share with Figure 1 the concepts of 
belief and preference, they do not provide an account of the origin of beliefs, desires and moral values and of the 
connection between desires, moral values and preferences. Moreover, the concept of future-directed intention 
is not included in the conceptual apparatus of game theory and epistemic game theory. The same can be said
2.4 Logics for mental attitudes, emotion and games
This section is devoted to discuss existing logics for mental attitudes and emotion proposed 
in AI as well as the connection between the representation of mental attitudes and emotion 
in logic and the representation of mental attitudes and emotion in game theory.
Logics for mental attitudes Since the seminal work of [31] aimed at implementing Brat-
man’s philosophical theory of intention [22], many formal logics for reasoning about mental 
attitudes of agents such as beliefs, desires and intentions have been developed. Among them 
we should mention the logics developed by [93; 90; 63; 75; 107; 108; 117; 130; 134; 148; 
155].
The general term used to refer to this family of logics is agent logics. A subfamily is the 
family of BDI logics whose most representative example is the modal logic by [117] whose 
primitive constituents are the the concepts of belief (B), desire (D) and intention (I) which 
are expressed by corresponding modal operators. Another well-known agent logic is the 
so-called KARO framework developed by [107]. KARO is a multi-modal logic framework 
based on a blend of dynamic logic with epistemic logic, enriched with modal operators for 
modeling mental attitudes such as beliefs, desires, wishes, goals and intentions.
Generally speaking, agent logics are nothing but formal models of rational agency 
whose aim is to explain how an agent endowed with mental attitudes makes decisions on 
the basis of what she believes and of what she wants or prefers. In this sense, the decisions 
of the agent are determined by both the agent’s beliefs (the agent’s epistemic states) and the 
agent’s preferences (the agent’s motivational states). As discussed in Section 2.1, the output 
of the agent’s decision-making process is either a choice about what to do in the present, 
also called present-directed intention, or a choice about what to do in the future, also called 
future-directed intention. The idea that the behavior of an agent can be explained by at-
tributing mental states to the agent and by having a sophisticated account of the relationship 
between her epistemic states and her motivational states and of the influence of these on 
the agent’s decision-making process is something agent logics share with other disciplines 
including philosophy of mind [38], cognitive sciences [116], psychology [118] and artificial 
intelligence [28].
Logics for emotion More recently, agent logics have been used to formalize the cognitive 
structure and the coping strategies of different types of emotion. For instance, a logical 
formalization of emotion in the context of the KARO framework has been proposed. In 
particular, in the KARO framework each emotion type is represented with a special pred-
icate, or fluent, in the jargon of reasoning about action and change, to indicate that these
for goals: the concept of goal is somehow implicit in the utility function but is not explicitly modeled.
predicates change over time. For every fluent a set of effects of the corresponding emotions 
on the agent’s planning strategies are specified, as well as the preconditions for triggering 
the emotion in terms of mental attitudes of agents. The latter correspond to generation rules 
for emotions. For instance, in [106] generation rules for four basic emotions are given: joy, 
sadness, anger and fear, depending on the agent’s plans. In [144] generation rules for guilt 
and shame have been proposed.
A logical formalization of the OCC psychological model of emotions [111] has been 
proposed in [1].
Surprise is the simplest emotion that is triggered by the mismatch between an expecta-
tion that an event will possibly occur and an incoming input (i.e., what an agent perceives). 
In [92] a logical theory of surprise is proposed. The theory clarifies two important aspects 
of this cognitive phenomenon. First, it addresses the distinction between surprise and aston-
ishment, the latter being the emotion triggered by something an agent could not reasonably 
expect. The crucial difference between surprise and astonishment is that the former neces-
sarily requires an explicit expectation in the agent’s mind, while the latter does not. One can 
be astonished by something since, at the moment she perceives it, she realizes that it was 
totally unpredictable, without having formulated an expectation in advance. For example, 
suppose Mary is working in her office. Suddenly, someone knocks the door and enters into 
Mary’s office. Mary sees that the person is a policeman. She is astonished by this fact even 
though, before perceiving it, she did not have explicit in her mind the expectation that “a 
policeman will not enter into the office”. Secondly, the theory clarifies the role of surprise 
in belief change by conceiving it as a basic mechanism which is responsible for triggering 
belief reconsideration.
In a more recent paper [99], a logical formalization of counterfactual emotions has 
been provided. Counterfactual emotions, whose prototypical example is regret, are those 
emotions that are based on counterfactual reasoning about agents’ choices. Other exam-
ples are rejoicing, disappointment, and elation. The formalization is based on an epistemic 
extension of STIT logic (the logic of “seeing to it that”) by Belnap et al. [13; 66; 25; 
89] and allows to capture the cognitive structure of regret and, in particular, the counterfac-
tual belief which is responsible for triggering this emotion, namely the belief that a counter-
factual better outcome might have been, had the agent chosen a different action. In [96], the 
STIT logical analysis of counterfactual emotions is extended to moral emotions. The latter 
involve counterfactual reasoning about responsibility for the transgression of moral values. 
In particular, the proposed formalization accounts for the attribution of responsibility for the 
violation of a moral value either to the self or to the other. This is a fundamental constituent 
of moral emotions such as guilt, reproach, moral pride and moral approval. For example, 
according to the proposed analysis, guilt is triggered by the belief that one is responsible for 
having behaved in a morally reprehensible way. A game-theoretic account of moral guilt, 
which parallels the STIT logical analysis, has been given in [97].
The problem of emotion intensity has also been adressed by logicians. Following exist-
ing psychological models of emotion based on appraisal theory, intensity of these emotions
is defined as a function of two cognitive parameters, the strength of the expectation and
the strength of the desire which are responsible for triggering the emotional response. For
instance, the intensity of hope that a certain event will occur is a monotonically increasing
function of both the strength of the expectation and the strength of the desire that the event
will occur. The logical theory of appraisal and coping presented in [36] also considers the
behavioral aspects of such emotions: how the execution of a certain coping strategy depends
on the intensity of the emotion generating it. Specifically, it is assumed that: (i) an agent is
identified with a numerical value which defines her tolerance to the negative emotion, and
(ii) if the intensity of the negative emotion (e.g., fear) exceeds this value then the agent will
execute a coping strategy aimed at discharging the negative emotion.
Logics for games The relationship between logic and game theory has been explored in
both directions: games for logic and logic for games. On the one hand, methods and tech-
niques from game theory have been applied to formal semantics, proof theory and model
checking for different kinds of logic [64; 51; 72]. On the other hand, logical representa-
tion languages have been proposed in computer science and AI to represent game-theoretic
concepts such as the concepts of strategy, capability, winning strategy as well as solution
concepts such as Nash equilibrium and backward induction. This includes logics such as
Coalition Logic [112], Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [5] and STIT (the logic of
“seeing to it that”) [13; 66].
More recently, logics for epistemic game theory have been proposed by incorporating
epistemic components in existing logics for games and developing new logical formalisms
that can represent, at the same time, the structure of the game and the mental attitudes and
rationality of the players involved in the game.
Much of the work in the field of epistemic game theory is based on a quantitative
representation of uncertainty and epistemic attitudes. Notable examples are the analysis
of the epistemic foundations for forward induction and for iterated admissibility based on
Bayesian probabilities [135; 59], conditional probabilities [11] or lexicographic probabili-
ties [21]. The distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches to uncertainty has
been widely discussed in the AI literature (cf. [49]). While in quantitative approaches be-
lief states are characterized by classical probabilistic measures or by alternative numerical
accounts, such as lexicographic probabilities or conditional probabilities [11], qualitative
approaches do not use any numerical representation of uncertainty but simply a plausibility
ordering on possible worlds structures inducing an epistemic-entrenchment-like ordering
on propositions.
Both logics for epistemic game theory based on a qualitative representation of epistemic
attitudes [9; 91; 98] and logics for epistemic game theory based on probability theory [59; 
17] have been proposed in the recent years. The main motivation for the latter is to exploit 
logical methods in order to provide sound and complete axiomatics for important concepts 
studied in epistemic game theory such as rationality and common knowledge of rationality. 
The main motivation for the former is to show that interesting results about the epistemic 
foundation for solution concepts in game theory can be proved in a qualitative setting, with-
out necessarily exploiting the complex machinery of probability theory.
The connection between logical models of epistemic states based on Kripke semantics 
and formal models of epistemic states based on the concept of type space has also been 
explored [46; 73]. While the former have been mainly proposed by logicians in AI [44] and 
philosophy [137], the latter have been proposed by game theorists in economics [61]. The 
main motivation for this research lies in the possibility of building a bridge between two 
research communities that study the same concepts and phenomena from different perspec-
tives.
3 From mental attitudes to institutions via collective attitudes
In this section we gradually move from minds to institutions. The connection between the 
former and the latter is built via the concept of collective attitude. Specifically, we discuss 
a particular view of institutions: the idea that institutional facts are grounded on the agents’ 
collective attitudes that, in turn, originate from the agents’ mental attitudes.
Section 3.1 starts with a discussion about the different functions and origins of collec-
tive attitudes, while Section 3.2 clarifies t he c onnection b etween c ollective a ttitudes and 
institutions. Finally, Section 3.3 explains how this connection has been formalized in logic.
3.1 Collective attitudes
Collectives such as groups, teams, coorporations, organizations, etc. do not have minds. 
However, we frequently ascribe intentional attitudes to them in the same way as we ascribe 
intentional attitudes to individuals. For example, we may speak of what our family prefers, 
of what the goal of a coorporation or organization is, of what the scientific community think 
about a certain issue, and so on.
Aggregate vs. common attitudes An important distinction in the theory of collective 
attitudes is between aggregate attitudes and common attitudes. As emphasized by [84] 
“...an aggregate attitude (of a collective) is an aggregate or summary of the attitudes of 
the individual members of the collective, produced by some aggregation rule or statistical 
criterion...”. A typical example of aggregate attitude produced by a statistical criterion is
shared belief, namely the fact that all agents (or most of the agents) in a set of agents 
believe that a certain proposition p is true. An example of aggregate attitude produced by an 
aggregation rule is the collective acceptance of a jury about a given proposition p obtained 
by majority voting: the jury believes that the proposition p is true if and only if the majority 
of the members of the jury has expressed the individual opinion that p is true. Aggregate 
attitudes produced by aggregation rules are the objects of analysis of judgement aggregation, 
an important research area in social sciences and AI (see [54; 83] for an introduction to 
judgement aggregation). Differently from common attitudes, aggregate attitudes do not 
require a level of common awareness by the members of the group. That is, a group can 
hold an aggregate attitude even though the members of the group do not necessarily believe 
so. For example, the fact that two agents share the belief that p is true does not necessarily 
imply that they individually believe that they share this belief. As emphasized by [84] 
“...a common attitude (of a collective) is an attitude held by all individual members of 
the collective, where their holding it is a matter of common awareness”, where the term 
“common awareness” refers to the fact that every member of the group believes that the 
group has the common attitude, that every member of the group believes that every member 
of the group believes that the group has the common attitude, and so on. A typical example 
of common attitude is common belief: every agent in the group believes that p is true, every 
agent in the group believes that every agent in the group believes that p is true, and so on ad 
infinitum.
Functions of collective attitudes Collective attitudes play a crucial role in the society as:
(i) they provide the basis of our common understanding through communication, (ii) they 
ensure coordination between agents, (iii) they are fundamental constituents of collaborative 
activities between agents acting as members of the same team.
In linguistic, the concept of common ground in a conversation is typically conceived 
as the common knowledge (or common belief) that the speaker and the hearer have about 
the rules of the language they use and about the meaning of the expressions uttered by the 
speaker [136]. Indeed, language use in conversation is a form of social activity that requires 
a certain level of coordination between what the speaker means and what the addressee 
understands the speaker to mean. Any utterance of the speaker is in principle ambiguous 
because the speaker could use it to express a variety of possible meanings. Common ground
— as a mass of information and facts mutually believed by the speaker and the addressee
— ensures coordination by disambiguating the meaning of the speaker’s utterance. For 
example, suppose two different operas, “Don Giovanni” by Mozart and “Il Barbiere di 
Siviglia” by Rossini, are performed in the same evening at two different theaters. Mike 
goes to see Don Giovanni and the next morning sees Mary and asks “Did you enjoy the 
opera yesterday night?”, identifying the referent of the word “opera” as Don Giovanni. In
order to ensure that Mary will take “opera” as referring to Don Giovanni, it has to be the 
case that the night before Mary too went to see Don Giovanni, that Mary believes that Mike 
too went to see Don Giovanni, that Mary believes that Mike believes that Mary too went to 
see Don Giovanni, and so on.
Moreover, since the seminal work by David Lewis [82], the concept of common belief 
has been show to play a central role in the formation and emergence of social conventions.
Finally, collective attitudes such as common goal and joint intention are traditionally 
used in in the philosophical area and in AI to account for the concept of collaborative activity 
[24; 55; 40; 41]. Notable examples of collaborative activity are the activities of painting a 
house together, dancing together a tango, or moving a heavy object together. Two or more 
agents acting together in a collaborative way need to have a common goal and need to form 
a shared plan aimed at achieving the common goal. In order to make collaboration effective, 
each agent has to commit to her part in the shared plan and form the corresponding intention 
to perform her part of the plan. Moreover, she has to monitor the behaviors of the others 
and, eventually, to reconsider her plan and adapt her behavior to the new circumstances.
The origin of collective attitudes Where do collective attitudes come from? How are 
they formed? There is no single answer to these questions, as collective attitudes can origi-
nate in many different ways.
As explained above, aggregate attitudes are the product of aggregation procedures like 
majority voting or unanimity (cf. [85]). The agents in a certain group decide to use a certain 
aggregation rule. Then, every agent expresses her opinion about a certain issue p and the 
aggregation rule is used to determine what the group believes or what the group accepts. 
Examples of collective attitudes originating from the aggregation of individual attitudes are 
group belief and collective acceptance.
Collective attitudes, such as shared belief and common belief, can also be formed 
through communication or joint perception. A source of information announces to all agents 
in a group that a certain proposition p is true. Under the assumption that every agent per-
ceives what the information source says and that every agent in the group trusts the informa-
tion source’s jugement about p, the agents will share the belief that p is true as a result of the 
announcement. Creation of common belief through communication requires satisfaction of 
certain conditions that are implicit in the concept of public announcement, as defined in 
the context of public announcement logic (PAL) [115], the simplest logic in the family of 
dynamic epistemic logics (DEL) [147]. Specifically, to ensure that an announcement will 
determine a common belief that the announced fact is true, every agent in the group has 
to perceive what the information source says, every agent in the group has to perceive that 
every agent in the group perceives what the information source says, and so on. The latter 
is called co-presence condition in the linguistic literature [30].
The concept of co-presence becomes particularly relevant in the perspective of design-
ing artificial systems situated in a physical environment that need to acquire common belief 
of certain facts in order to achieve coordination and to make collaboration effective. For 
example, imagine two robots moving in the physical environment. A source of information 
signals to them that there is a danger. It does this by emitting a red light. The robots will be 
able to form different levels of mutual belief about this fact depending on: (i) their spatial 
positions and the orientation of their sensors with respect to the source of information, and 
(ii) the perception of the other robots’ spatial positions and of the orientations of the other 
robots’ sensors with respect to the source of information. The concept of co-presence ap-
plies not only to agents interacting in a physical environment but also to agents interacting 
in a virtual environment (e.g., virtual characters of a videogame).
A side note: collective acceptance vs. common belief A property that clearly distin-
guishes collective acceptance from common belief is that common belief implies shared 
belief, while collective acceptance does not: when there is a common belief in a group of 
agents C that a certain proposition p is true then each agent in C individually believes that 
p is true, while it might be the case that there is a collective acceptance in C that p is true, 
and at the same time one or several agents in C do not individually believe that p is true. 
For example, the members of a Parliament might collectively accept (qua members of the 
Parliament) that launching a military action against another country is legitimate because by 
majority voting the Parliament decided so, even though some of them — who voted against 
the military intervention — individually believe the contrary. This difference is due to the 
fact that collective acceptance is a kind of aggregate attitude which can be formed through 
aggregation procedures others than unanimity.
Another important difference between collective acceptance and common belief is the 
irreducibility of collective acceptance to the individual level. In particular, it has been em-
phasized that, while common belief is strongly linked to individual beliefs and can be re-
duced to them, collective attitudes such as collective acceptance cannot be reduced to a 
composition of individual attitudes. This aspect is particularly emphasized by Gilbert [47] 
who follows Durkheim’s non-reductionist view of collective attitudes [42]. According to 
Gilbert, any proper group attitude cannot be defined o nly a s a  l abel o n a  p articular con-
figuration of individual a ttitudes, as common belief i s. In [48; 143] i t is suggested that a 
collective acceptance of a set of agents C is based on the fact that the agents in C iden-
tify themselves as members of a certain group, institution, team, organization, etc. and 
recognize each other as members of the same group, institution, team, organization, etc. 
Common belief and common knowledge, as traditionally defined in epistemic logic [44], 
do not entail this aspect of mutual recognition and identification with respect to the same 
group, institution, team, organization, etc.
3.2 Grounding institutions and norms on collective attitudes
In the previous section we have explained how collective attitudes are generated from mental
attitudes through aggregation procedures, communication or joint perception.
The next step in our analysis is to explain how institutions and norms are grounded on
collective attitudes of different types including collective acceptance and common belief.
The term “grounded” means that the existence and the evolution of institutions and norms
depend on the existence and the evolution of the collective attitudes of the agents who are
members of the institution and who are subject to the norm.
We focus here on two forms of grounding that have been considered in the literature:
the grounding of institutions on collective acceptance and the grounding of conventions on
common belief.
Collective acceptance and institutions The problem of understanding what institutions
are and how they function has been addressed both in social sciences, in philosophy and
in legal theory. Computer scientists working in the area of multi-agent systems have been
interested in devising artificial institutions, modeling their dynamics and the different kinds
of rules and norms of an institution that agents have to deal with. Following [110, p.
3], artificial institutions can be conceived as “the rules of the game in a society or the
humanly devised constraints that structure agents’ interaction”. In some models of ar-
tificial institutions norms are conceived as means to achieve coordination among agents
and agents are supposed to comply with them and to obey the authorities of the system
[43]. More sophisticated models of institutions leave to the agents’ autonomy the deci-
sion whether to comply or not with the specified rules and norms of the institution [2;
88]. However, all previous models abstract away from the legislative source of the norms
of an institution, and from how institutions are created, maintained and changed by their
members.
What these models of artificial institutions neglect is the fundamental relationship be-
tween institutions and the collective attitudes of their members and, in particular, the fact
that the existence and the dynamics of an institution (norms, rules, institutional facts, etc.)
are determined by the collective attitudes of the agents which identify themselves as mem-
bers of the institution. This aspect is emphasized in the following quote from [101, p. 77]:
“only because institutions are anchored in peoples minds do they ever become
behaviorally relevant. The elucidation of the internal aspect is the crucial step
in adequately explaining the emergence, evolution, and effects of institutions.”
[Emphasis added].
Prominent philosophical theories of institutional reality conceives collective acceptance 
as the collective attitude on which institutions are grounded [128; 142]. The relationship
between acceptance and institutions has also been emphasized in the philosophical doctrine
of Legal Positivism [62]. According to Hart, the foundations of an institution consist of
adherence to, or acceptance of, an ultimate rule of recognition by which the validity of any
rule of the institution may be evaluated. 16
Common belief and conventions Convention is a concept that has been widely studied
in economics [138], philosophy [16; 141] and computer science [153; 151; 131; 129], given
the fundamental role it plays in the regulation of both human and artificial societies.
Eating manners, the kind of clothes we wear in office, and the side of the road on which
we drive are mundane examples of convention. Roughly, a social convention is a customary,
arbitrary and self-enforcing rule of behavior that is generally followed and expected to be
followed in a group or in a society at large [82]. When a social convention is established,
everybody behaves in an agreed-upon way even if they did not in fact explicitly agree to
behave in this way. A social convention can thus be seen as a kind of tacit agreement that
has evolved out of a history of previous interactions [138; 141].
Since the seminal contribution by David Lewis [82], the modern approach to conven-
tions is rooted both in epistemic logic and in evolutionary game theory. The epistemic
approach to the study of conventions has focused on the characterization of the kind of mu-
tual beliefs and expectations that are required for a group to adopt a certain convention [34;
132; 150] and on the distinction between the epistemic conditions of conventions in con-
trast with the epistemic conditions of social norms [14]. The epistemic approach clearly
highlights the fact that conventions are grounded on collective attitudes. Indeed, according
to the well-known definition of convention by David Lewis [82, pp. 76], a given regularity
of behavior R is a convention for a population of agents P at a recurrent situation S, only if
the agents in the population P mutually expect everyone in P to conform to the regularity
R in the situation S (and commonly believe so). In other words, for a convention to exist,
the agents in the population have to form a mutual expectation about each other’s behavior
(and a common belief about this). Consider the example of driving on the left-hand side
in the UK. This is a convention as every person in the UK expects other people in the UK
to drive on the left-hand side of the road. Moreover, every person in the UK expects other
people to drive on the left-hand side of the road because and as long as she expects other
people to expect everyone to drive on the left-hand side of the road.
The evolutionary approach to the study of conventions has focused on the conditions
under which a certain convention can emerge on a given population of agents depending on
the agents’ learning capabilities. Notable examples of this approach are the models by Kan-
dori et al. [71] and Young [156] which make predictions about the conditions under which
16In Hart’s theory, the rule of recognition is the rule that specifies the ultimate criteria of validity in a legal 
system.
agents converge to equilibrium in a certain coordination game by learning the others’ play 
and adjusting their strategies over time. For instance, Kandori et al.’s model investigates 
the dynamic process that leads the agents to converge to the risk dominant equilibrium in a
repeated 2 × 2 coordination game.
It is worth noting that the epistemic approach and the evolutionary approach to the 
study of conventions have not yet been reconciled. Indeed, none of the existing evolution-
ary models of conventions deals with the epistemic aspect of conventions, as they do not 
assume agents to be cognitive and only consider a simplified notion of convention as a mere 
regularity of behavior.
3.3 Logics for institutions
In [95] a modal logic of collective acceptance is proposed, in accordance with the philo-
sophical theories of this notion discussed in Section 3.2. In the logic, collective acceptance 
is conceived as the collective attitude that some agents have qua members of the same in-
stitution. In particular, a collective acceptance held by a set of agents C qua members of a 
certain institution x is the kind of acceptance the agents in C are committed to when they are 
“functioning together as members of the institution x”, that is, when the agents in C iden-
tify and recognize each other as members of the institution x. For example, in the context 
of the institution Greenpeace agents (collectively) accept that their mission is to protect the 
Earth qua members of Greenpeace. The state of acceptance qua members of Greenpeace is 
the kind of acceptance these agents are committed to when they are functioning together as 
members of Greenpeace, that is, when they identify and recognize each other as members of 
Greenpeace. The logic accounts for different kinds of aggregation procedures that the mem-
bers of an institution may adopt in order to build a collective acceptance of a given fact. This 
includes unanimity, majority and a criterion based on leadership according to which what 
the members of an institution collectively accept coincides with the acceptance of the legis-
lator of the institution. Moreover, the logic clearly distinguishes collective acceptance from 
common belief, by emphasizing the fact that, while common belief is reducible to individ-
ual beliefs, collective acceptance cannot be reduced to individual attitudes of the members 
of an institution. The fact that collective acceptance is not reducible to individual attitudes 
is reflected in the formal semantics of the logic. While in epistemic logic common belief is 
commonly represented by means of the transitive closure of the union of the accessibility 
relations for the individual beliefs, the accessibility relation for collective acceptance is not 
definable in terms of the accessibility relations for individual beliefs or individual accep-
tances. Moreover, collective acceptance entails the notion of “group identification” that is 
not reducible to the individual level.
Following the idea of some prominent philosophical theories of institutions [128; 142] 
according to which institutional reality only exists in relation with the collective acceptance
of institutional facts by the members of the institution, a systematic analysis of institutional
concepts in the context of this logic is given. This includes the concepts of weak permission,
strong permission, obligation and constitutive rule.
The relationship between the logic of collective of acceptance and existing logics of
institutions has also been investigated. This includes the comparison between the logic of
collective acceptance and the logic of institutional facts proposed by [69] and refined more
recently by [53]. According to [69; 53], the primary aspect of institutional facts is their
being true in the context of an institution x.
In [95], the bridge between collective acceptance and informal institutions is built by
assuming that:
a certain fact ϕ is true in the context of an informal institution x if only if the
members of the informal institution x collectively accept that ϕ is true (in the
context of x).
Differently from formal or legal institutions, informal institutions have no official of the
law who is in charge of promulgating new norms and who is the guarantor of their validity.
An example of informal institution is a language whose rule specifying the relationship
between a certain utterance and its meaning is shared by a group of people: in the context
of this group, the utterance has a certain meaning since the language speakers collectively
accept this.
In [94], the analysis is extended to formal and legal institutions in which legislators and
officials of the law exist who are in charge of either creating new norms or suppressing
existing ones out of collective deliberation and who are guarantors of the norms’ validity.
Specifically, it is assumed that:
a certain fact ϕ is true in the context of a formal institution x if only if the
legislators of the institution x collectively accept that ϕ is true (in the context
of x).
For example, according to the French law, the legal drinking age is 18 since this fact is 
accepted by the French legal authority. As emphasized in Section 3.2, this is close to Hart’s 
idea that a legal norm exists because it adheres to the standards of validity specified by the 
ultimate rule of recognition that has to be accepted by the legal authority. For example, 
the Italian legal authority accepts that a norm is valid as far as it has been promulgated by 
the Italian parliament and published in the “Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana” 
(Official Gazette of the Italian Republic).
4 Conclusion: closing the circle
In the previous sections we have explained: (i) the role of mental attitudes in decision-
making and in action performance as well as the relationship between mental attitudes and
emotion (Section 2), (ii) how collective attitudes are generated from mental attitudes as well
as the relationship between institutions and norms, on the one hand, and collective attitudes,
on the other hand (Section 3). More generally, we have moved from the mental level to the
collective level and, then, from the collective level to the institutional-normative level. It is
now time to close the circle by going back to mind.
The relevant question here is the following: how do institutions and norms, that are
grounded on agents’ collective attitudes retroactively influence decision-making and action?
First of all, for a norm or convention to affect an agent’s decision, it has to be recognized
by the agent, that is, the agent has to believe that the norm or convention exists and that if
she does not conform to it, she will incur a violation The latter is called normative belief
by [32] (see also [6]). Recognition of a convention is guaranteed, if the agent belongs
to the group of agents in which the convention holds. Indeed, as emphasized in Section
3.2, according to Lewis’ definition, a certain regularity of behavior R is a convention for
a population of agents P if and only if the agents in P mutually expect everyone in P to
conform to the regularityR and commonly believe so. Thus, if agent i is a member of P and
R is convention for P , then i has to believe that R is convention for P . The latter follows
from the fact that if the agents in P have a common belief that some proposition p holds,
then every agent in P has to believe so.17
Once the norm or convention with its associated costs and sanction for violation has
be recognized by an agent, the agent will take it into consideration in her decision-making
process. For the sake of clarity, we here distinguish norm compliance from mere norm
following. Norm compliance requires the goal to conform to the content of the norm. In
other words, for an agent to comply with a norm, she has to be motivated by the goal of
conforming to what the norm prescribes. For example, an agent complies with the norm
of paying taxes if she wants to pay taxes, after having recognized the corresponding norm
that she ought to pay taxes. Norm following just requires that the agent chooses an action
knowing that this choice will lead her to conform to what the norm prescribes. To sum
up, while norm compliance requires purposively (or intentionally) conforming to what the
norm prescribes, norm following only requires knowingly conforming to what the norm
prescribes. Under the assumption that “purposively doing” implies “knowingly doing”,
norm compliance can be seen as a special case of norm following.
Two different forms of norm compliance exist. As we have emphasized in Section 2.1,
some norms are internalized by the agent and give rise to moral values. If the agent decides
17This property can be formally proved in the logic of common belief [44].
to comply with them, she does it for ethical or moral reasons. In these cases, the agent’s goal
of conforming to what the norm prescribes is mainly originated from moral considerations.
This is ethical or moral compliance. For example, an agent may comply with the legal
obligation to pay taxes for ethical or moral reasons: the agent wants to pay taxes because
she is motivated by the moral value to behave honestly. More generally, ethical compliance
requires that the agent’s goal of conforming to what the norm prescribes does not depend
on the agent’s actual desires18 but only on the agents’ actual moral values.19
In other cases, the agent complies with the norm because she desires to avoid the sanc-
tion or the social cost as a consequence of the violation and because she fears punishment.
This is opportunistic compliance which is typical for conventions such as the following one:
Except for pizza, sandwiches and other “finger foods”, don’t eat with your
fingers.
This is a convention in Europe, as every person in Europe expects other people in Europe
to follow it and every group of European people has a common belief that each of them ex-
pects the others to follow the convention. An European person believes that the convention
exists and wants to follow it because she desires to avoid the social cost associated with the
violation (e.g., the cost of being publicly blamed if she eats the food with her fingers).
In the case of opportunistic compliance, the agent wants to conform with what the norm
prescribes because the consequences of norm violation (e.g., sanction, social cost, punish-
ment) are undesirable for her, while the consequences of norm fulfillment (e.g., reward,
social approval) are desirable for her. More generally, opportunistic compliance requires
that the agent’s goal of conforming to what the norm prescribes does not depend on the
agent’s actual moral values but only on the agents’ actual desires.
We conclude the paper with the general observation that, although norm compliance
has been extensively studied in the area of multi-agent systems, with an emphasis on both
its logical aspects [3; 122; 74], and computational aspects [33; 4; 88; 149; 79], there is
still no formal model which captures the distinctions between norm following and norm
compliance, and between ethical compliance and opportunistic compliance. We believe this
is an important issue. Its understanding would allow to complement a bottom-up approach
to institutions, grounding them on the mental level via the collective level, with a top-down
approach, explaining how institutions and norms influence the agents’ cognition.
18This means that if the agent did have different desires in her mind, he would have had still the goal to 
follow the norm.
19This means that it is possible for the agent to reconsider her actual moral values in such a way that her 
goal to follow the norm is also reconsidered.
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